Seminar Vol. 220
Title: Uncertainty in Procurement Contracting with Time Incentives
Speaker: Naibao Zhao, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics
Time: May 6th, 2020 15:00-16:30
About the speaker:
Naibao Zhao is an associate professor of economics (without tenure) at the Research Institute of Economics and Management (RIEM), Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (SWUFE), Chengdu China. He is also a member of the Human Capital and Economic Opportunity (HCEO) “Inequality: Measurement, Interpretation, and Policy” working group (MIP) at the University of Chicago.
His broad research field is empirical microeconomics that integrates economic theory with empirical evidence by using rigorous econometric analysis to study policy relevant questions. In particular, his research covers a wide range of topics, including empirical IO, inequality, education, and human development.
Zhao received his Ph.D. in Economics from Texas A&M University in 2018 and his B.Eng. in Electronic and Information Engineering from Shenzhen University in 2006.
Abstract:
This paper studies A+B (cost-plus-time) procurement contracting with time incentives in the highway construction industry. In the presence of construction uncertainty, the contractor’s actual completion time may deviate from the bid completion time, and the A+B contract design is not ex post efficient. Using data from highway procurement in California, we show through a counterfactual analysis that ex post efficient lane rental contract would reduce the social cost by $41.05 million (42.76%) on average. In particular, the average commuter cost would decrease by $61.22 million (77.89%), suggesting a substantial reduction in the construction externality to commuters from lane rental contracts.
Interested in this webinar? Please contact Feiyan at feiyantang@jnu.edu.cn, or scan the QR code bellow to register by May 5th (12 PM).