Seminar Vol. 219
Title: Mergers and Merger Waves under Incomplete Information
Speaker: Jiajia Cong, Fudan University
Time: April 29th, 2020 13:30-15:00
About the speaker:
Jiajia Cong is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Industrial Economics, School of Management, Fudan University. His research interests center around Industrial Organization and Applied Microeconomics. Jiajia Cong's work has appeared in such journals as Management Science, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, and others.
Abstract:
This paper studies how incomplete information affects firms' merger incentives and the likelihood of merger waves. We find mergers become strategic complements under incomplete information even if they are strategic substitutes under complete information. Total merger frequency and the likelihood of merger waves are very likely to increase under incomplete information. Compared with the scenario that no firm has private information, leading firms usually would like to pay to be informed. Following firms would always stay ignorant intentionally even if they can know demand information without any cost. Incomplete information tends to increase the joint profits of leaders and followers, but it hurts consumer surplus.
Interested in this webinar? Please contact Feiyan at feiyantang@jnu.edu.cn, or scan the QR code bellow to register by April 28th (12 PM).
