Title: Partisan and Bipartisan Gerrymandering

Speaker: Assistant Professor Zhenyu Pan, Wuhan University

Time: April 14th 2017 15:00–16:15

Venue: Conference Room 106B, Zhonghui Building (College of Economics, JNU)

Abstract:

This paper analyzes the optimal partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering policies in a model with electoral competitions in policy positions and transfer promises. With complete freedom in redistricting, partisan gerrymandering policy generates the most one-sidedly biased district prole, while bipartisan gerrymandering generates the most polarized district prole. In contrast, with limited freedom in gerrymandering, both partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering tend to prescribe the same policy. Friedman and Holden (2009) nd no significant empirical difference between bipartisan and partisan gerrymandering in explaining incumbent reelection rates. Our result suggests that gerrymanderers may not be as free in redistricting as popularly thought.