题目：Profit Enhancing Leakage (Showrooming), Platform Deterrence and Beneficial Ban

主讲人：陈林峰，浙江工商大学

时间：2024年4月26日（星期五）下午13:30-15:00

地点：暨南大学（石牌校区）中惠楼106会议室

主讲人简介:

陈林峰，香港大学经济学博士，清华大学硕士，扬州大学本科。已发表一篇JIE。研究兴趣：用经济学优化现实。用现实研究经济学。

Abstract:

Buyers could showroom on the platform which is bad for the platform in the literature. And the platform might apply price parity clauses to deter showrooming. Different countries have different regulations for this clause. In contrast to the literature, we show that showrooming could be good for the platform in general conditions. Without commitment power, the platform would deter showrooming and hurt itself. The ban on price parity clause helps the platform to commit and benefit all players. With commitment power, the platform would optimally choose an interior level of showrooming and it is socially too small. The results hold for the wholesaler model.