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【Seminar 347】李凯(北京大学汇丰商学院)

2023-04-10
摘要Finance Lease and Capital Allocation Efficiency in China

题目:  Finance Lease and Capital Allocation Efficiency in China

主讲人:李凯,北京大学汇丰商学院

时间:  2023年4月12日下午13:30-15:00 

地点:暨南大学石牌校区中惠楼106室



主讲人简介:

李凯教授现任北京大学汇丰商学院金融学长聘副教授。他毕业于美国杜克大学,获得经济学博士学位。他的主要研究领域为资产定价、宏观金融、金融经济学和中国金融市场等。他的研究专注于构建、验证和应用一套基于融资约束的资产定价新理论,并应用于中国金融市场的重要理论和实证问题。多篇论文发表在Journal of Finance, Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Monetary Economics, Review of Finance, Journal of Corporate Finance, Financial Management 以及《比较》等国内外金融学和经济学期刊 (含录用待刊)。他主持国家自然科学基金优秀青年科学基金项目(海外),并曾连续五年成为香港青年研究基金和优配研究基金获得者。他目前担任《经济学》(季刊)副主编。


摘要:

Finance lease is often considered equivalent to secured lending in mainstream finance literature and receives little attention in academic research. In this paper, we argue that the finance lease plays a special role in improving capital allocation efficiency in China, particularly in the context of limited access to bank loans for small and medium-sized enterprises. Using a two-sector general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms, information asymmetry, and financial frictions, we demonstrate that the presence of a finance lease market increases aggregate total factor productivity by enabling low-productivity state-owned enterprise (SOE) firms to lend effectively to high-productivity privately owned enterprise (POE) firms. We also find that finance lease has become the dominant representation of shadow banking in China. Furthermore, due to its repossession advantage, finance lease is a “good” form of shadow banking as it poses lower systemic risk to the financial system compared to other forms of shadow banking. Our findings have significant policy implications for China’s shadow banking regulations.


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