题目: How Wage Offers Affect Job Applicants: Field Experimental Evidence on Directed Search

主讲人：何浩然，北京师范大学

时间：10月30日，13:30-15:00

地点：暨南大学石牌校区曾宪梓科学馆406会议室

主讲人简介：

何浩然，瑞典哥德堡大学经济学博士，北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院教授、博士生导师、国家一级运动员。主要研究领域为行为经济学、实验经济学、劳动力市场、亲社会行为、团队决策、公共政策评估。近年来在Journal of Labor Economics、Experimental Economics、Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization、Journal of Economic Psychology、Economics Letters、China Economic Review、《管理世界》、《经济学（季刊）》、《世界经济》等期刊上发表多篇论文。

摘要：

We explore the impact of wage offers on job applications, testing implications of the directed search model and trying to distinguish it from random search. We use a field experiment conducted on a Chinese job board, with real jobs for which we randomly varied the wage offer across three ranges. We find that higher wage offers raise application rates overall, which is consistent with directed search but can also arise with random search. We also find that higher wage offers raise application rates for job seekers with reservation wages lower than all wage offers, and the increase in application rates is stronger for those with higher reservation wages. The latter type of evidence is consistent with directed search but not random search. Hence, they lend support to directed search models.