题目：Uncertainty in Procurement Contracting with Time Incentives
主讲人：赵乃宝，西南财经大学
时间：2020年5月6日，15:00-16:30
举办方式：线上讲座
主讲人简介：
His broad research field is empirical microeconomics that integrates economic theory with empirical evidence by using rigorous econometric analysis to study policy relevant questions. In particular, his research covers a wide range of topics, including empirical IO, inequality, education, and human development.
Zhao received his Ph.D. in Economics from Texas A&M University in 2018 and his B.Eng. in Electronic and Information Engineering from Shenzhen University in 2006.
Abstract：
This paper studies A+B (cost-plus-time) procurement contracting with time incentives in the highway construction industry. In the presence of construction uncertainty, the contractor’s actual completion time may deviate from the bid completion time, and the A+B contract design is not ex post efficient. Using data from highway procurement in California, we show through a counterfactual analysis that ex post efficient lane rental contract would reduce the social cost by $41.05 million (42.76%) on average. In particular, the average commuter cost would decrease by $61.22 million (77.89%), suggesting a substantial reduction in the construction externality to commuters from lane rental contracts.
报名方式：
非经济与社会研究院的师生需报名参加本次线上讲座，请感兴趣的师生扫码下方二维码报名，报名截止时间为2020年5月5日12:00。
