【SEMINAR第219期】从佳佳（复旦大学）

2020-04-25

摘要Mergers and Merger Waves under Incomplete Information

题目：Mergers and Merger Waves under Incomplete Information

主讲人：从佳佳，复旦大学

时间：2020年4月29日，13:30-15:00

举办方式：线上讲座

主讲人简介：

从佳佳，复旦大学管理学院产业经济系助理教授。研究兴趣集中于产业组织理论和应用微观经济学，具体包括企业并购和沉默持股、大数据对企业策略的影响等。研究成果发表于Management Science、Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization等刊物。

Abstract：

This paper studies how incomplete information affects firms' merger incentives and the likelihood of merger waves. We find mergers become strategic complements under incomplete information even if they are strategic substitutes under complete information. Total merger frequency and the likelihood of merger waves are very likely to increase under incomplete information. Compared with the scenario that no firm has private information, leading firms usually would like to pay to be informed. Following firms would always stay ignorant intentionally even if they can know demand information without any cost. Incomplete information tends to increase the joint profits of leaders and followers, but it hurts consumer surplus.

报名方式：

非经济与社会研究院的师生需报名参加本次线上讲座，请感兴趣的师生扫码下方二维码报名，报名截止时间为2020年4月28日12:00。