主讲人简介:方大炜，2006年本科毕业于复旦大学国际金融系，2013年从牛津大学获得经济学博士学位，现为哥德堡大学副教授。他的研究兴趣集中于竞争与竞赛理论、公司金融、组织经济学、人事经济学。其许多研究工作涉及如何设计激励合同和人事制度以最大化股东价值，以及探讨公司内部和外部竞争对公司生产力、资本结构和创新的影响。其研究成果发表于Journal of Political Economy，Journal of Labor Economics，Journal of Corporate Finance，Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control等国际顶级或知名学术期刊上。

Abstract:Risk-taking spurred by rank-based contest rewards can have enormous consequences, from developing breakthrough technologies in research competitions to hedge fund collapses engendered by risky bets aimed at raising league-table rankings. We develop a theoretical model of risk-taking that permits contestants to make arbitrary, mean-preserving changes in their random contest performance and use this framework to produce determinant predictions about the effect of contest structure on the statistical properties of contestant performance---including modality, tail behavior, dispersion, and skewness. In a laboratory experiment utilizing an interactive distribution builder to elicit subjects' risk-taking strategies, we confirm our main theoretical predictions. Increasing the real-gain inequality of contest rewards or contest size increases performance dispersion; convexifying the rank-reward relationship or adding contestants to a contest with a fixed number of identical winner rewards increases both the dispersion and skewness of performance.