题目：Subjective Performance Evaluation, Influence Activities, and Bureaucratic Work Behavior: Evidence from China

主讲人：张琼

时间：2021年3月26日，14:00 — 15:30 （北京时间）

举办方式：线上讲座

Zoom ID: 931 678 9264 

参会密码：790971

主讲人简介

张琼，经济学博士，现为中国人民大学公共管理学院副教授。研究主要关注人口、劳动与社会保障等领域公共政策评估。主持国家自然科学基金、教育部人文社科一般项目以及斯坦福大学研究基金等多个项目。在《经济研究》、《世界经济》、《金融研究》以及Population Studies等中英文期刊发表论文近30篇。曾获第17届（2016年度）孙冶方经济科学奖论文奖等奖项。

Abstract

Subjective performance evaluation is widely used by firms and governments to provide work incentives. However, delegating evaluation power to local leadership could induce influence activities: agents might devote much effort to impressing or pleasing their supervisors, rather than working toward the goals of the organization. In this paper, we conduct a large-scale randomized field experiment among Chinese local civil servants and provide the first rigorous empirical evidence on the existence and implications of influence activities. We find that civil servants do engage in evaluator-specific influence to affect evaluation outcomes, which likely involve both reallocating work efforts toward job tasks that are more observable to the evaluator, and buttering up the evaluator personally. Importantly, we find that introducing uncertainty in the identity of the evaluator discourages evaluator-specific influence activities and significantly improves the work performance of local civil servants.