题目：Medical Testing as Optimal Information Acquisition

主讲人：Kyeongbae Kim，芝加哥大学

时间：2020年8月14日，10:00-11:30

举办方式：线上讲座

Dr. Kim graduated University of Chicago with PhD in Economics in 2020. His research interests include empirical industrial organization, health economics and econometrics. He is now a fellow at Korea Development Institute.

Abstract：

This paper formulates a model of optimal information acquisition, by developing a dynamic structural model of observation and adjustment costs. I then apply the empirical framework to medical testing in which a provider must balance the competing goals of making informed treatment decisions and saving testing costs for a diabetic patient's health. The novel feature of the model is that the state, a patient's blood sugar level, is not observed by a provider. If she chooses not to pay an observation cost for medical testing, the true state remains unobserved and the following treatment adjustments may be inaccurate. I combine the dynamic structural model with confidential administrative data on patient health from universal health screening and information acquisition behavior. I find that the higher cost of blood sugar testing leads to blood sugar levels that are more dispersed over time through ill-informed prescription adjustments. Counterfactual exercises show that performing an A1C test, the state-of-art method of blood sugar testing, every six months is the most cost-effective diabetes management considering its monetary costs and health benefits, with an additional cost of $11,018.66 for one extra quality-adjusted life-year.