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【SEMINAR第224期】戴芸(中山大学)

2020-05-12
摘要Employee Mobility Restrictions and Non-executive Employee Stock Options

题目:Employee Mobility Restrictions and Non-executive Employee Stock Options

主讲人:戴芸,中山大学

时间:2020年5月15日,13:30-15:00

举办方式:线上讲座

主讲人简介:

戴芸,现任中山大学岭南学院金融学助理教授。2014年于荷兰鹿特丹伊拉斯姆斯大学获得金融学博士学位,2015年成为特许金融分析师(CFA)持证者。在加入岭院之前,戴芸曾先后任教于荷兰格罗宁根大学、荷兰鹿特丹伊拉斯姆斯大学。其主要研究兴趣为公司金融、实验及行为金融、和中国经济。已有研究发表(含接受)在Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis、Games and Economic Behavior、Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 和《经济研究》(2篇)等国内外期刊上;主持国家自然科学基金青年项目以及中山大学高校基本科研业务费青年培育项目;担任《经济研究》、《管理世界》、《管理科学学报》、Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 等多本国内外经济学期刊匿名审稿人。

Abstract:

This paper studies the effect of reduced employee mobility on employers’ incentive to grant stock options for employee retention purpose. Exploiting staggered amendments of non-compete enforceability in three U.S. states as an exogenous shock to employee mobility, we find that stricter enforcement of non-compete clauses in a state negatively affects the value of stock options granted to non-executive employees by firms in the state. Furthermore, this negative effect is more pronounced for firms with higher competition for human capital. These findings suggest that stronger non-compete enforcement weakens firms’ needs of using stock options to retain employees. Our findings reveal the importance of legal restrictions on employee mobility in shaping corporate employee compensation policies.

报名方式:

非经济与社会研究院的师生需报名参加本次线上讲座,请感兴趣的师生扫码下方二维码报名,报名截止时间为2020年5月14日12:00。

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