【SEMINAR第213期】宋阳（柯尔盖特大学）
2020-04-15
摘要Centralized College Matching Mechanisms, Stability, and Student Welfare
题目：Centralized College Matching Mechanisms, Stability, and Student Welfare
主讲人：宋阳，柯尔盖特大学
时间：2020年4月17日，9:30-11:00
举办方式：线上讲座
Yang Song is an assistant professor of economics at Colgate University. Her research focuses on education, development, and behavioral economics, and has been published in Journal of Comparative Economics, Research in Economics, and China Economic Review. Using empirical and experimental methods, her current work centers on understanding the effects of education inputs and policies, as well as how to improve educational equity, work efficiency, and learning outcomes. Song earned her B.A. in international economics and trade from the Renmin University of China and her M.A. and Ph.D. in economics from the University of Pittsburgh.
This paper estimates the causal effects of matching mechanism on stability and student welfare, exploiting temporal and provincial variations in the college matching mechanisms in China. Individual-level data on the Chinese College Entrance Exams (CEEs) and admission outcomes allow us to construct precise measures of stability under reasonable assumptions of student preferences. We find that changing from the Immediate Acceptance mechanism to the Chinese parallel mechanism reduces both dichotomous and continuous measures of justifiable-envy, shortens the distance to stable matching outcomes, and reduces the proportion of students who face severe consequences from the matching outcomes.
非经济与社会研究院的师生需报名参加本次线上讲座，请感兴趣的师生扫码下方二维码报名，报名截止时间为2020年4月16日12:00。
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