题目：Escalation of Scrutiny: The Gains from Dynamic Enforcement of Environmental Regulations

主讲人：Ashley Langer，亚利桑那大学

时间：2019年10月14日，10:30-12:00

地点：暨南大学中惠楼106B室

主讲人简介：

Ashley Langer is currently an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Arizona. Previously, she taught at the University of Michigan, which she joined after earning her Ph.D. in Economics from the University of California, Berkeley in 2010. Her primary research fields are environmental and energy economics, and empirical industrial organization. Ashley Langer has published her work in such international journals as Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Industrial Economics, Review of Economics and Statistics, and Journal of Urban Economics.

Abstract:

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency uses a dynamic approach to environmental enforcement for air pollution, with repeat offenders subject to high fines and designation as high priority violators (HPV). We estimate the value of dynamic enforcement by developing and estimating a dynamic model of a plant and regulator, where plants decide when to invest in pollution abatement technologies. We use a fixed grid approach to estimate random coefficient specifications. Investment, fines, and HPV designation are costly to most plants. Eliminating dynamic enforcement would raise emissions damages by 167% with constant fines or raise fines by 533% with constant pollution.