SEMINAR第17期：Strategic Sequential Bidding for Government Land Auction Sales – Evidence from Singapore

题目：Strategic Sequential Bidding for Government Land Auction Sales – Evidence from Singapore

报告人：李敬

时间：2016年11月16日13：30-15：00

地点：暨南大学中惠楼106B

个人简介：

李敬，新加坡管理大学Lee Kong Chian助理教授。她于2013年获得美国雪城大学经济学博士学位。她的研究领域为城市经济学、健康经济学和房地产金融。她的研究成果发表于 Journal of Urban Economics, Regional Science and Urban Economics, and the Journal of Applied Econometrics等期刊。

摘要：This paper studies the extent to which equilibrium auction prices are pushed up sequentially due to strategic bidding behaviors in government land auction sales. Using a unique dataset that covers the universe of tendering prices submitted by all developers for all residential land auction sales in Singapore, we find that a tenderer’s bids are significantly higher where there was a previous land parcel sold within two years and located within four kilometers. The elevated price margin decreases with time and geographic distance. Tracking sequential bids submitted by same developers over time, we find that the incumbent winner of a previous auction often participates in subsequent nearby land sales but does not necessarily win the sites. We argue that the incumbent deliberately bids up the subsequent land prices to gain pricing advantages to their own parcels.

李敬